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ENTREPRENEURS’ EXPLORATORY PERSEVERANCE IN LEARNING SETTINGS 
 
Abstract: We introduce ‘exploratory perseverance’ as a novel construct that captures 
perseverant behavior in settings in which several alternatives can be explored and evaluated. We 
suggest that entrepreneurs display exploratory perseverance reflected by a tendency to keep 
exploring broader sets of alternatives, to adopt a parallel rather than sequential approach to trial-
and-error learning, and, after negative experiences with some alternatives, to be more inclined to 
give them a second chance. The results from an experimental study of 449 individuals 
participating in the Iowa Gambling Task indicate that more entrepreneurially experienced 
individuals display greater exploratory perseverance than those with little to no entrepreneurial 
experience.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have documented substantial differences between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs in the way they gather, process, and evaluate information and use it as input for 
their decision making and learning (e.g., Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 
2000; Keh, Foo, & Lim, 2002; Weitzel et al., 2010). One characteristic that is typically ascribed 
to entrepreneurs is perseverance—commitment to a chosen course of action and its undaunted 
pursuit despite adversity (e.g., Baron, 2004; Markman & Baron, 2003; Patel & Thatcher, 2012; 
Van Gelderen, 2012; Verheul et al., 2012). Prior literature has indeed documented entrepreneurs’ 
above-average willingness or capability to persevere in the face of adversity (Gimeno et al., 
1997; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; Markman et al., 2005), or as Holland and Shepherd recently put 
it, to decide, time and time again, to “continue to pursue a previously selected entrepreneurial 
opportunity” (Holland & Shepherd, 2013: 333) against opposing motivational forces. 
Strong evidence points to entrepreneurs’ perseverance in pursuing a particular 
opportunity after they have committed to this opportunity by starting their business. Scholars 
have gained significant insights into antecedents (Gimeno et al., 1997; DeTienne et al., 2008; 
Holland & Sheperd, 2013; Markman et al., 2005) and emotional and financial implications (e.g., 
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Baum & Locke, 2004; Markman et al., 2005; Sandri et al., 2010; Shepherd et al., 2009) of such 
perseverance. However, it remains an open question whether entrepreneurs are also more 
perseverant prior to having selected a particular opportunity. If several viable opportunities exist 
what does it actually mean to be perseverant? In entrepreneurial situations that require the 
exploration of several alternatives, for example, when choosing product or technology portfolios 
or business partners, do entrepreneurs quickly choose one path on which they “continue […] 
regardless of counterinfluences or enticing alternatives” (Holland & Shepherd, 2013: 333)?  
As a first step toward addressing this research question, we investigate entrepreneurs’ 
perseverance in a setting that captures important aspects of entrepreneurs’ exploration of 
alternatives. This setting includes the structuring of information-gathering processes, learning 
from informational cues, (re-)evaluating available options, and the assessment of whether and 
when to exclude an option from further consideration (e.g., technology or product portfolio 
development, market segments). This setting is characterized by the possibility of making 
choices from a set of alternatives, where each choice carries both a payoff consequence and an 
informational cue. This informational cue points to the long-term payoff of the corresponding 
alternative, which may, however, diverge considerably from short-run payoffs. Repeat choices 
from the same set of all alternatives are feasible. At each step of this process, new information 
may prompt a re-evaluation of the options within the set. We refer to this type of setting as a 
concurrent learning setting because several options can be explored virtually in parallel. Because 
this setting substantially differs from those in previous studies of entrepreneurs’ perseverance, 
we are able to shed new light on this concept. 
For concurrent learning settings, we conceptually develop exploratory perseverance as a 
behavioral pattern. Exploratory perseverance implies choosing repeatedly, over a sequence of 
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decision moments, from a broad choice set of alternatives, despite adverse experiences with 
some of them (‘keep going back to other options, despite setbacks’). The second critical feature 
of exploratory perseverance is therefore a tolerance for negative outcomes when exploring 
alternatives, resulting in a broader set of informational cues to learn from, which—as a third 
feature—is coupled with a parallel approach to exploring alternatives. As such, exploratory 
perseverance involves sustained openness and deliberate choices that include seemingly inferior 
alternatives that are awarded a “second chance”. Our basic proposition is that entrepreneurs 
exhibit such exploratory perseverance in concurrent learning settings. We concur that 
entrepreneurs are likely to continue sampling information about options that have previously 
produced negative results and do so to a greater degree than non-entrepreneurial individuals. 
We assess these questions using an extensively validated neuropsychological framework 
for the study of exploratory decision making and learning—the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)—and 
compare entrepreneurs’ and non-entrepreneurs’ decisions in performing this task. In so doing, we 
follow a nascent literature that analyzes entrepreneurial decision making using laboratory and 
experimental methods (e.g., Burmeister & Schade, 2007; Haynie et al., 2012). We sample 449 
individuals from two populations: students with varying levels of entrepreneurial experience, as 
well as a heterogeneous set of entrepreneurs and a matched sub-sample from the general 
population. The data and results robustly support our hypotheses. 
This study makes two major contributions. First, it adds to the literature on 
entrepreneurial perseverance/persistence
1
 by (i) conceptualizing exploratory perseverance as a 
novel theoretical construct, (ii) by pointing out the possibility of distinguishing between types of 
                                                 
1
  The terms ‘perseverance’ and ‘persistence’ are sometimes but not always used interchangeably in the 
literature in order to denote continued pursuit of a course of action despite opposition. In order to avoid conceptual 
ambiguities, we use the term ‘perseverance’ to capture this notion.  
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perseverance and especially the distinction between referring to an individual action or a 
behavioral pattern, and (iii) by suggesting differences in the phase-specific relevance of these 
types. Our study enables future research to more accurately conceptualize and analyze the 
contexts and ways in which we expect entrepreneurs to persevere. Furthermore, the results from 
this study demonstrate that differences in perseverance can be detected outside the 
entrepreneurial venture when zooming in on selected features of entrepreneurial ventures, such 
as learning opportunities in explorative settings. We find that perseverance is a distinct feature of 
entrepreneurs’ decision making in a context that is largely devoid of factors such as switching 
costs, vested interests, social norms, and so on. This suggests that exploratory perseverance is 
rather fundamental in nature and not solely a context-contingent characteristic of entrepreneurs. 
Our findings therefore help to reconcile prior research on entrepreneurs’ perseverance that did 
not find evidence of entrepreneurs’ stronger perseverance in settings outside of the 
entrepreneurial venture (e.g., Burmeister & Schade, 2007; Sandri et al., 2010). 
Second, this study adds to research on entrepreneurial learning, which investigates the 
how entrepreneurs “acquire and transform information and experience” (Corbett, 2007: 97). We 
show how entrepreneurs’ learning differs from that of others: entrepreneurs’ are more likely to 
continue sampling information about options that have previously produced negative results. 
That is, they are “once bitten, twice still not shy”. Thereby, this study identifies entrepreneurs’ 
exploratory motivation as a complementary driver of their perseverance, adding to individual 
characteristics such as elevated overconfidence (Baron, 1998; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Forbes, 
2005; Koellinger et al., 2007; Simon et al., 2000; Wu & Knott, 2006), reduced loss aversion 
(Burmeister & Schade, 2007), and related personality characteristics, for example, neuroticism 
(Bibby & Ferguson, 2011; Patel & Thatcher, 2012), which have been discussed in other contexts. 
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Rather than simply being less averse to losses, their persistence when faced with adversity may 
partially result from accepting losses as an inevitable part of exploratory learning. Thus, 
perseverance with a venture may result from an exploration motive. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Foundations of entrepreneurs’ decision making and learning: Perseverance and 
exploration 
Intragroup heterogeneity notwithstanding, marked differences appear to exist between the 
typical patterns of the decision making, thinking, and learning of entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs (for a recent overview, see Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). Perseverance is 
one such feature that is often viewed as particularly characteristic of entrepreneurs’ decision 
making and learning (e.g., Baron, 2004; Markman & Baron, 2003; Patel & Thatcher, 2012; Van 
Gelderen, 2012; Verheul et al., 2012). Perseverance can generally be defined as the pursuit of a 
chosen course of action in spite of adversity and counterinfluences.
2
 Scholars have indeed 
empirically documented entrepreneurs’ above-average willingness or capability to persevere 
when faced with obstacles (Gimeno et al., 1997; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; Markman et al., 2005). 
Lowe and Ziedonis (2006), for example, found that entrepreneurs continued development efforts 
for longer periods of time when faced with negative outcomes than established firms did. Prior 
behavioral evidence of entrepreneurs’ particular adeptness at “sticking to it” has primarily been 
obtained for the specific context of entrepreneurial venture operations, i.e., after entrepreneurs 
have already committed themselves to a particular opportunity. Such a focus allows little 
                                                 
2
  While our definition of ‘perseverance’ is generic, Holland and Shepherd (2013) provide a similar definition 
applied specifically to the entrepreneurial context. They define entrepreneurial persistence as “when the 
entrepreneur chooses to continue with an entrepreneurial opportunity regardless of counterinfluences or enticing 
alternatives” (Holland and Shepherd, 2013: 331). 
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inference as to whether perseverance is a context-independent, fundamental characteristic of 
entrepreneurs. 
Evidence from the few studies that have investigated factors related to entrepreneurs’ 
perseverant behavior in contexts other than entrepreneurial venture operations have mostly failed 
to yield significant support for perseverance as a distinct, general characteristic of entrepreneurs 
vis-à-vis non-entrepreneurs. For example, Burmeister and Schade (2007) analyzed, in an 
experimental setting, whether entrepreneurs were affected by status quo bias in their decision 
making, with status quo bias being defined as “the tendency to select a previously chosen 
alternative disproportionately often” (Burmeister & Schade, 2007; 340). While they found 
support for this basic hypothesis, entrepreneurs were not more susceptible than students and less 
susceptible than bankers. Sandri and co-authors (2010) experimentally analyzed disinvestment 
choices of enterprising and other individuals in the laboratory as “a problem of optimal stopping, 
stylizing a context-free choice to abandon a project for a constant termination value” (Sandri et 
al., 2010: 35). They found evidence of ‘psychological inertia’ — which can be interpreted as a 
form of perseverance — in the sense that participants tended to “hold on to a losing project” 
(Sandri et al., 2010: 30) for too long. Holding on for “too long” was assessed in comparison to a 
rational benchmark in a real-options framework that incorporated a rational value for waiting. 
However, there was no significant difference between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in 
terms of delayed exit from the project.  
We argue that it would be premature to conclude from these studies that above-average 
perseverance is not a general characteristic of entrepreneurs vis-à-vis non-entrepreneurs. Instead, 
we suggest that previous insignificant results may stem from too narrow an interpretation of the 
perseverance construct, as well as from the specific characteristics of the lab settings employed 
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in these studies. ‘Real-world’ entrepreneurial venture operations, in which superior perseverance 
of entrepreneurs has been documented, are characterized by two core features: First, time and 
time again, entrepreneurs are faced with the choice between two options: stay the course after 
having committed to a particular opportunity or exit and “abandon the effort” (Shane, Locke, & 
Collins, 2003: 271). One of the choices, to exit, is largely irreversible. The entrepreneur can opt 
to exit only once (at least relating to a specific venture). Second, as Holland and Shepherd (2013) 
argue, if the entrepreneur repeatedly chooses to persist with the venture, s/he obtains new 
information and feedback and thereby continues to learn something (e.g., about the viability of 
the venture). Thereby, learning may also include learning about the specific path or strategy a 
venture follows, that is, learning to select an optimal strategy from a multitude of strategic 
options. 
 Prior lab studies that failed to find evidence of entrepreneurs’ superior perseverant 
behavior have zoomed in on the first of these two features and have modeled decisions between 
alternatives in which one of them was irreversible (exit). Therefore, the second property related 
to information acquisition, feedback, and learning about an initially unknown state was either 
absent or marginalized in the lab settings employed in earlier work. We complement these prior 
studies by focusing on this second core feature.  
Specifically, we investigate whether entrepreneurs display above-average perseverance in 
‘concurrent learning settings’ that involve choices from a set of alternatives (i) where each 
choice carries both a payoff consequence and an informational cue about the long-term benefit of 
the corresponding alternative, (ii) where repeat choices from the same set of all alternatives are 
feasible (no irreversible option included), and (iii) where there may be a trade-off between short-
run payoffs and long-run payoffs from the various alternatives. At each step of this learning 
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process, new information may prompt a re-evaluation of the options within the set. Business 
practice is rich in contexts that fall into this category during all stages of the entrepreneurial 
process, from opportunity identification to exploitation. Early venture stages may be particularly 
rife, for example, when entrepreneurs consider paid employment (continuation, scaling, re-entry) 
vis-à-vis episodic self-employment (e.g., Parker, 2004; Patel & Thatcher, 2012), time allocation 
between a new venture and paid employment (Burmeister-Lamp et al., 2012), and the selection 
of technology or product portfolios.  
Previous entrepreneurship research on perseverance (e.g., Holland & Shepherd, 2013; 
Gimeno et al., 1997) usually relates to persevering with a business that the entrepreneur has 
already started and where no viable alternative other than exiting the chosen business exists. 
Corresponding perseverance is affected by self-justification and switching costs and so on. Such 
perseverance is, by definition, absent from the type of concurrent learning setting that we study, 
where several alternatives but no option to exit exist. Complementing this type of setting by 
considering concurrent learning settings, we explicitly capture behavioral patterns that accord 
with entrepreneurs’ typical approach to information acquisition and processing. 
In concurrent learning settings, perseverance can assume different meanings. First, 
perseverance may capture a behavior that implies the repeated, successive choice of the same 
alternative in spite of the possible negative information cues and experiences with this alternative 
and in spite of other readily available options. Relating to the general definition of perseverance 
as commitment to a chosen course of action and its pursuit in spite of adversity, the activity in 
question is interpreted as essentially equivalent to the chosen alternative. Hence, we refer to this 
type of perseverance as narrow perseverance. 
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Second, if the equivalence between the activity and the alternative is relaxed, 
perseverance in such a concurrent learning setting can also refer to the continued pursuit of a 
course of action that implies retaining, over a sequence of decision moments and despite adverse 
experiences with at least some of them, a broad choice set of alternatives, as opposed to 
narrowing down the choice set early in the process. A choice set is defined as the set of 
alternatives from among the initially available alternatives that a person does not exclude from 
his or her information search. We refer to this specific behavioral pattern as exploratory 
perseverance. Unlike narrow perseverance, i.e., sticking to a particular alternative (‘keep going 
with the same option, despite setbacks’) from an early stage of the exploration process onwards, 
exploratory perseverance aims at continuing to try and learn for longer (‘keep exploring options, 
despite setbacks’).3  
Hence, the two types of perseverance that we focus on and which apply to concurrent 
learning settings are conceptually different from and complement prior conceptualizations of 
perseverance. For example, in business reality, an entrepreneur might persist with one business 
that he/she has already started while at the same time continuing to explore other possibilities 
(exploratory perseverance) related to, for example, a potential second business opportunity. 
Portfolio entrepreneurs or, generally, entrepreneurs that persist with one particular “business” but 
are simultaneously inclined to consider other new products or markets are examples that 
illustrate the complementarity of the concept of exploratory perseverance with perseverance as it 
has previously been studied in the literature. 
In fact, entrepreneurs have been shown to have a greater inclination to explore many 
                                                 
3
  As such, exploratory perseverance is related to research on feedback-based learning that has found 
interpersonal differences in learning during noisy tasks in which feedback has a reduced value (Hogarth & Villeval, 
2010): While some individuals exit early because they believe further signals have no informative value, others 
persist and keep collecting more information by observing more signals across time. 
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alternatives (Baron, 2004; Busenitz, 1996) and to favor experimentation over exploitation 
(Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Busenitz, 1996; Wang, 2008). A preference for exploratory 
perseverance in concurrent learning settings would be consistent with entrepreneurs’ observed 
tendency to continue to believe in the potential value of several alternatives from a range of 
options, even when negative feedback during the exploration of the particular alternative signals 
its potential inferiority (Baron & Markman, 2003; McMullen & Shepherd, 2002; Corbett, 2007). 
Non-entrepreneurs, in contrast, are more easily convinced that an option in question is not worth 
pursuing and are, therefore, more likely to exclude it from further consideration. The same 
objective failure probabilities are, thus, less likely to deter entrepreneurs from exploring 
alternatives (McMullen & Shepherd, 2002; Corbett, 2007). As such, perseverance motivated by a 
need for exploration reflects both sustained openness and a tolerance for negative experiences, 
that is, a willingness to consider seemingly inferior alternatives for a longer time period.
4
 Such 
behavior could also explain prior observations that entrepreneurs seem to be comparatively slow 
at incorporating information (Parker, 2006): they require more information (for example, on 
costs and benefits of individual alternatives) before they are satisfied with the amount and depth 
of information such that they actually modify their decisions. Instead of assuming that they learn 
less, we might interpret the observation as entrepreneurs aiming at more information to guide 
their decision making. In other words, they persevere for longer in their exploration. 
Broad Choice Set vs. Concentration of Choices 
The typical approach of entrepreneurs’ to information acquisition and processing has been 
described as being geared towards examining greater numbers of distinct alternatives (e.g., 
                                                 
4
  A broader choice set could also result from a perception of alternatives as equally good. A tolerance for 
negative outcome histories could also lead to a perpetual repetition of the same inferior behavior. Thus, both 
behaviors are simultaneously needed for a behavioral pattern of exploratory perseverance to emerge.  
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Busenitz, 1996; Corbett, 2007; Crossan et al., 1999; Wang, 2008). Recent studies into their 
shared cognitive, affective, and motivational tendencies underpin this view. From a cognitive 
perspective, researchers have argued that entrepreneurs differ from non-entrepreneurs in their 
frames, their learning from, thinking about, interpreting, and exploring the world (e.g., Baron, 
1998, 2004; Cooper et al., 1995; Corbett, 2007; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Krueger, 2003). Many of 
the identified differences are consistent with keeping a broader rather than a narrower choice set. 
Gaglio and Katz (2001) and Gaglio (2004), for example, suggest that entrepreneurs’ cognition is 
characterized by chronic alertness, which makes them particularly acutely aware that existing 
means-ends frameworks may be inappropriate. Studies into entrepreneurs’ cognitive breadth 
(Kim et al., 2010) and their ability to identify potentially complex patterns in business models 
(Baron & Ensley, 2006; Baron & Ward, 2004) suggest that more entrepreneurially experienced 
individuals are better able to cognitively deal with complex patterns and to keep a larger number 
of potentially conflicting ideas in play. 
Evidence from studies that focus on affect or integrate emotional aspects related to 
entrepreneurs’ decision making into the cognitive perspective (e.g., Hayton & Cholakova, 2012) 
also lends support to the notion that entrepreneurs might retain a broad choice set. Studies in this 
line of research have, for example, found that entrepreneurs tend to be high in dispositional 
positive affect, that is, they expect positive moods and emotions often and in a wide range of 
contexts (Baron et al., 2011; Baron et al., 2012). Dispositional positive affect expands the scope 
of an individual’s attention, cognition, and action (Baron et al., 2012; Frederickson & Barnigan, 
2005). Positive affect, in general, broadens the mindset by stimulating considerations of a wider 
range of possibilities and actions (Frederickson, 2001) and reduces the selectivity of attentional 
filters (Rowe et al., 2007).  
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Finally, research on the foundations of entrepreneurs’ motivational systems is also 
indicative of a greater width of choice sets. In particular, scholars have drawn on regulatory 
focus theory (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1997, 1998) to explain differences between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in the processes of setting goals, selecting means, and 
evaluating progress towards goal attainment (Baron, 2004; Brockner et al., 2004). According to 
this perspective, goal-directed behavior is governed by two motivational systems (Higgins, 1997, 
1998). The prevention system features an orientation towards ‘oughts’ and induces people to aim 
at avoiding mistakes by abstaining from actions that might produce negative outcomes (Pham & 
Higgins, 2005). The promotion system implies an orientation towards ideals and encourages 
individuals to generate and consider a larger set of alternatives, out of an eagerness to seize 
opportunities (Liberman et al., 2001; Pham & Higgins, 2005). Entrepreneurs appear to share a 
tendency towards a ‘dispositional’ promotion focus and the associated behaviors (Alvarez & 
Busenitz, 2001; Bryant, 2007; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  
In sum, we expect that entrepreneurs’ shared affective, cognitive, and motivational 
tendencies manifest themselves in a concurrent learning setting in a continued exploration of a 
broad set of alternatives rather than a quick narrowing down of their choice set to a small subset. 
Hypothesis 1: In a concurrent learning setting, entrepreneurs are more likely than non-
entrepreneurs to retain a broad choice set. That is, they do not concentrate on a narrow 
choice set early on. 
Parallel vs. Sequential ‘Trial and Error’ 
Retaining, despite setbacks, a broad choice set can be achieved by using a range of 
different temporal selection strategies. To illustrate this, let us assume, first, that the set of 
available alternatives initially consists of alternatives A, B, C, D, from which information can be 
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sampled during twelve decision events. Second, let us assume that all four alternatives are 
explored to a maximum (each of them is selected three times). Then, a range of temporal 
selection strategies is possible, with the two extreme points being (i) a (comparatively) ‘parallel’ 
approach to ‘trial-and-error’ (e.g., A, B, C, D, A, B, C, D, A, B, C, D), which entails frequent 
switching in one’s information sampling between the different alternatives, and (ii) a 
(comparatively) ‘sequential’ approach to ‘trial-and-error’ (e.g., A, A, A, B, B, B, C, C, C, D, D, 
D), which entails less switching during the exploration process (e.g., Eggers & Green, 2012). In 
this example, parallel ‘trial-and-error’ yields quicker insights into the cross-sectional 
relationships between the four alternatives and represents a more global perspective. Sequential 
‘trial-and-error’ is a more focused approach for quicker comprehension of (local) information 
about specific characteristics and their dynamics. Sequential ‘trial-and-error’, however, allows 
for global comparisons across alternatives only at a much later stage.  
Direct empirical evidence on whether entrepreneurs generally tend to use a parallel or 
sequential ‘trial-and-error’ approach is limited. A few studies address related issues, however. 
Literature on entrepreneurs’ distinct skills offers indirect evidence. Distinct cognitive and 
affective skills appear to contribute to this greater likelihood of and preference for parallel 
tasking as well.  
Studies into entrepreneurs’ cognitive breadth (Kim, Clelland, & Bach, 2010) and their 
ability to identify potentially complex patterns in business models (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Baron 
& Ward, 2004) suggest that entrepreneurs and, especially, more experienced entrepreneurs are 
better able to cognitively deal with complex patterns and to keep a larger number of potentially 
conflicting ideas in play. These cognitive tendencies enable and possibly predispose them to 
favor parallel ‘trial and error’ because a sequential approach can be interpreted as a coping 
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mechanism in response to excessive strain on information processing capacities.  
Distinct affective components of entrepreneurial learning, such as higher comparative 
optimism (cf. Ucbasaran et al., 2010) and higher dispositional positive affect (Baron et al., 2011, 
2012), appear to further add to greater cognitive flexibility and scope of attention. Strong, 
positive affect has been shown to induce cognitive strategies that allow for coping with higher 
stress levels (Carver & Scheier, 2001), which are associated with simultaneous rather than 
sequential processing.  
Motivational factors related to a possible dispositional promotion focus (Alvarez & 
Busenitz, 2001; Bryant, 2007; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) offer tentative support for 
entrepreneurs’ simultaneous exploration. A promotion focus has been associated with a more 
global and ‘top-down’ approach to the searching, perception, and processing of information 
(Förster and Higgins, 2005; Pham & Higgins, 2005; Semin et al., 2005) and with more variety-
seeking in search processes as a way of capturing additional opportunities (Pham & Higgins, 
2005). Zhu and Meyers-Levy (2007) found that individuals engaged in either one of two modes 
of information processing, depending on their regulatory focus. Promotion-focused individuals 
tended towards relational processing, that is, the integration of shared aspects and abstracting 
from differences among dissimilar pieces of information (Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Johnson, 
1984). Prevention-focused persons were likely to adopt item-specific processing, which refers to 
generating precise, context-specific associations for each item in isolation of others (Hunt and 
Einstein 1981). Because parallel ‘trial and error’ generates relational information more quickly 
than a sequential approach, it is more consistent with a promotion focus.  
Overall and based on previous research, we expect the following:   
Hypothesis 2: In a concurrent learning setting, entrepreneurs are more likely than non-
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entrepreneurs to use a parallel rather than sequential ‘trial and error’ approach. 
Tolerance for Negative Experiences  
Tolerance for negative experiences is a key element of perseverance. When applied to 
exploratory perseverance, this characteristic implies that seemingly inferior alternatives — 
according to current information and experience history — are not dropped from a choice set at a 
too-early stage. Prior studies offer indirect evidence — through cognitive, affective, and 
motivational lenses — that suggests that entrepreneurs may possess a superior tolerance for 
negative experiences. 
First, from cognitive and affective viewpoints, Parker (2006) found that entrepreneurs 
were generally comparatively slow in adjusting their expectations in light of new information. 
More specifically and relating to experiencing and processing negative information, scholars 
have found that entrepreneurs tend towards a substantially rosier outlook on the future, as 
indicated by stronger (over-)optimism and comparative optimism (Ucbasaran et al., 2010), as 
well as dispositional positive affect (Baron et al., 2011, 2012). Interpersonal differences in 
dispositional affect, for example, influence how information is encoded into memory, implying 
differences in what is later available for retrieval and use in decision making (Eich, 1995). High 
levels of positive affect are associated with a tendency to memorize and remember positive 
information. As a result, biased samples of information may be stored and later used in decision 
making (Miller, 2008), for example, relating to ideas for a new product (Baron et al., 2012). 
Also, strong positive affect has been shown to induce cognitive strategies that allow for coping 
with the higher stress levels (Carver & Scheier, 2001) associated with negative experiences.  
Second, from a motivational angle, research into the effects of regulatory focus on the 
nature and magnitude of emotional reactions to success and failure (e.g., Brockner & Higgins, 
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2001) tentatively suggests that entrepreneurs may be relatively more tolerant and forgiving of 
negative experiences. Halamish and colleagues (2008) report that individuals with a prevention 
focus were more loss-averse. Particularly in ambiguous environments, they restrict the set of 
alternatives they consider more quickly and strongly in response to a history of negative 
experiences (Pham & Chang, 2010). Promotion-focused individuals, in turn, are more variety-
seeking in their search processes as a way of capturing additional opportunities (Pham & 
Higgins, 2005). Hence, to the extent that entrepreneurs tend towards a promotion focus (e.g., 
Bryant, 2007), we expect that the same objective failure probabilities deter entrepreneurs less 
than non-entrepreneurs from exploring alternatives that performed poorly in the initial stages of 
the information-sampling process. This proposition is also consistent with evidence that 
entrepreneurs are less concerned with avoiding failure and instead focus on potential success in a 
multitude of options (McMullen & Shepherd, 2002). This is also consistent with 
conceptualizations of entrepreneurial learning as being anticipatory and oriented towards future 
possibilities rather than past patterns (Crossan et al., 1999).  
In sum, we expect that entrepreneurs have a stronger tendency to continue sampling 
information about alternatives with inferior outcome histories. That is, we expect them to be 
more likely to give ‘second chances’.  
Hypothesis 3: In a concurrent learning setting, entrepreneurs exhibit greater tolerance 
for negative experiences than non-entrepreneurs.  
METHODS 
Experimental design: The IOWA Gambling Task  
The IOWA Gambling Task (IGT) is an established, extensively validated, easy-to-
administer, and unobtrusive clinical measurement instrument from the domain of 
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neuropsychology (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). The 
IGT is rather abstract and without particular reference to the entrepreneurial context. Because 
scholars have shown that thoughts may become increasingly channeled by past experience 
(Shepherd et al., 2003), this contextual independence allows us to draw a meaningful comparison 
between more and less entrepreneurially experienced individuals. The IGT was designed to 
quantify differences between individuals regarding the degree to which their learning and 
decision making are insensitive towards negative outcomes (‘punishment’) and thus malleable 
based on experience and new information (Bechara et al., 1994). The IGT resembles a situation 
in which individuals must learn, through trial-and-error-based exploration, that an option that 
initially — due to relatively higher immediate payoffs — appears advantageous is, in the long 
run, inferior because of occasionally high losses.  
The IGT’s specific experimental design involves four decks of cards (A, B, C, D), which 
are placed face down. Individuals pick one card at a time from one of the decks and turn it 
around to see two values (see Figure 1). The first value indicates the immediate and regular gain 
associated with a deck; the second value indicates a complementary, uncertain, and irregular 
loss. Two decks (A, B) yield high immediate and regular gains but, at unpredictable points in 
time, they also include high penalties, turning the net benefit of these decks negative. For decks 
C and D, the immediate gains and occasional penalties are smaller than for decks A and B, but 
the occasional penalties are sufficiently small to result in a positive net payoff for decks C and D. 
Because the positive values are constant, learning in the IGT relates to the frequency and level of 
penalties. The detailed schedules of payoffs can be found in Bechara et al. (1994). Individuals 
start without any information about the decks; they may switch at any point in time and as often 
as they wish. They do not know in advance the number of decisions they make, but the standard 
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version of the game ends after an individual has made 100 selections in total. Note that the 
design of the IGT penalizes insensitivity towards negative outcomes. Individuals with such a 
behavioral pattern underperform in the IGT. Because the IGT, therefore, does not reward 
exploratory perseverance in performance terms, it represents a conservative test of our 
hypotheses.  
In this study, we used an online implementation of the standard instructions for the 
computerized version of the IGT, as developed and used in the prior research (Bechara et al., 
1999; Bechara et al., 1994). To prevent location effects, the decks A, B, C, D were presented in a 
random order on the screen for every subject (and not labeled A, B, C, D). The task was 
incentivized by way of lottery tickets (Starmer & Sugden, 1991). Each point earned in the IGT 
was converted into a lottery ticket. The number of points therefore directly determined the 
probability of winning a prize. Because subjects could lose points, we provided them with an 
initial endowment of 2,000 points to ensure non-negative final scores.  For the student sample, 
there were three lotteries of 150 Euros each. In the entrepreneurs’ subsample, there were two 
lotteries: a candlelit dinner (~200 Euros) and a choice between Russian caviar and French 
champagne (~100 Euros). 
To facilitate a more in-depth interpretation of our experimental findings, we briefly 
summarize the basic neuropsychological interpretation of individual differences in the IGT. The 
IGT is often used to test the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 
1994). The SMH suggests that experience of reward and punishment evokes bioregulatory 
processes. Somatic markers are body-related responses that hallmark emotions and are reflective 
of these bioregulatory processes, which guide behavior in such a way that negative experiences 
are avoided in the long term (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, Tranel, 
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& Damasio, 2000). In healthy individuals, somatic markers represent the link between past 
emotional reactions to negative stimuli on the one hand and future responses on the other hand. 
In patients with certain brain lesions, this link is broken. Specifically, individuals with lesions in 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and in the bilateral amygdala are argued to suffer 
from disrupted functioning of somatic markers (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994; Horstmann 
et al., 2012; Bechara et al., 1996).
5
 The IGT has been used to test this hypothesis.  
Studies using the IGT have demonstrated that patients who show severe impairment in 
real-life decision making (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1998; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985) 
indeed do not sufficiently respond to the negative experiences in the IGT. Despite normal 
intellect, memory, and problem-solving abilities, these patients displayed very low performance 
on the IGT. While the details regarding the somatic marker hypothesis are still subject to 
ongoing debate
6
, the IGT’s ability to discriminate between people with more or less persistence 
in response to negative experiences is well-established. The benefits of using the IGT in order to 
uncover differences between subgroups of healthy people are also illustrated by a growing 
stream of research that relates IGT performance to personality traits (Franken & Muris, 2005; 
Harman, 2011) and demographic features (d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 2006). 
Sample 
Our sample is composed of 349 students with varying levels of entrepreneurial 
experience (Sample 1) and 100 non-student individuals (Sample 2). Sample 2 consists of ‘real’ 
entrepreneurs, individuals who have gained actual experience in running their own ventures, and 
                                                 
5
  Sometimes, the IGT is employed in combination with the analysis of skin conductance responses (SCRs) as 
physiological indicators of the arousal accompanying bioregulatory processes. Depending on the brain region 
affected by lesions, individuals underperforming on the IGT fail to produce both reactive and anticipatory SCRs 
(amygdala patients) or may generate reactive but not anticipatory SCRs (VMPFC patients) (Bechara et al., 1996; 
Bechara & Damasio, 2005). 
6
  Such details include, for example, the complementary roles of various other brain regions in the generation 
of somatic markers (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999, see also Dunn et al., 2006; Toplak et al., 2010). 
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a matched group of people from the pooled normal data published in the Iowa Gambling Task 
Manual (Bechara, 2007). While the student sample is relatively homogeneous and large, 
providing substantial statistical power for our hypothesis tests (cf. Bönte et al., in press, Urbig et 
al., 2012), the second sample offers more heterogeneity across entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs and therefore more insight into the extent to which conclusions drawn from the 
student sample can be generalized to other populations. Our sample sizes are similar or even 
exceed (for Sample 2) the samples sizes reported in comparable IGT studies (e.g., d’Acremont & 
Van der Linden, 2006; Harman, 2011) and in incentivized experimental studies in 
entrepreneurship research (e.g., Gatewood et al., 2002; Sandri et al., 2010).  
The student sample is drawn from a database of 1,200 students who had registered for 
participation in laboratory experiments at Utrecht University, in the Netherlands. Each student 
received an email with an invitation to participate in a web-based experiment, followed by an 
online survey (see Gatewood et al., 2002, on web-based experiments in entrepreneurship 
research). Together with the invitation, each recipient received a unique login code that provided 
one-time access to the website with the IGT task. Three hundred and fifty-eight students 
completed both the IGT and the subsequent survey. We omitted nine persons who waited more 
than five minutes for at least one decision, suspecting that they were distracted.7 The final 
student sample contains 349 students, who participate in about 39 distinct study programs 
ranging from ‘Economics’ to ‘Geo Sciences’ and ‘Law’. Sixty-four percent of the students are 
female, and the average age is 23.6 years. 
Data on entrepreneurs for the non-student sample were collected using a mobile lab (e.g., 
Harrison et al., 2002) at an annual entrepreneurship event in Utrecht, the Netherlands (“Week 
                                                 
7
 Results do not change substantially, and conclusions are the same when including these nine observations. 
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van de Ondernemer”).
8
 Since its foundation in 1998, this entrepreneurship event has emerged as 
the major annual venue for entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. It represents a mixture between a 
platform for networking, presentations, and workshops for entrepreneurs and attracts several 
thousand entrepreneurs each year. We followed a similar procedure as Elston and Audretsch 
(2011). We approached participants at random and asked whether or not they had ever started 
their own new business and, thus, had substantial experience as entrepreneurs. These 
entrepreneurs were guided to a booth to complete the IGT on a laptop and answered a brief 
electronic questionnaire. Among the entrepreneurs’ sample, 24 percent had previously been 
entrepreneurs but did not own their company anymore. Seventy-six percent were still owners at 
the time of the data collection. Their businesses had an average age of 8.7 years and an average 
size of 27 employees. Entrepreneurs’ data were matched with the pooled normal data9 published 
in the IGT manual (Bechara, 2007), kindly provided by Antoine Bechara. Observations from the 
normative sample were matched based on ‘age’ and ‘gender’ at a ratio 3:1. We do not have 
specific information on the entrepreneurial experience of these matched data points. However, 
based on the fact that the normative sample reflects the general population, we are confident that 
the level of entrepreneurial experience in the matched normative sample is much lower than in 
the sample of entrepreneurs. Overall, 24 percent were women, and the average age was 39.7 
years.  
Dependent variables 
Performance 
The standard criterion used for comparisons of performance in the IGT (e.g., Bechara et 
                                                 
8
  Further information is available from the website of the event: http://www.weekvandeondernemer.nl. 
9
 The underlying design differs slightly from the original IGT but provides comparable behavioral responses 
(Bechara et al., 2000). 
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al., 1999; Chiu and Lin, 2007) is the frequency of choices from objectively advantageous decks. 
Decks A and B are the ex-post ‘disadvantageous decks’ with high immediate gains and steady 
payoffs but occasionally very high losses. Decks C and D are the ex-post ‘advantageous decks’ 
with moderate immediate gains and steady payoffs but only occasional small losses. The more 
participants select from decks A and B, the poorer their final performance. At the beginning of 
the IGT, participants do not know which card decks represent decks A, B, C, and D. The speed 
with which they learn to concentrate on decks C and D reflects the degree to which they actually 
shy away from decks that generate strong negative experiences (A and B). Following standard 
practices in evaluating the IGT, we evaluate the relative frequency of selections from decks C 
and D over blocks of 20 decisions (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000). 
Broad choice set vs. concentration of choices  
In order to assess the degree to which participants continued to explore a broad set of 
alternatives over the course of the total 100 choices they made, we measured the degree of 
concentration of selections in the IGT by calculating the Herfindahl index (HI) of subjects’ 
choices. The HI is a widely used continuous measure of concentration (e.g., Hitt et al., 2001), 
which in our analysis, captures the concentration of choices across all available decks (A, B, C, 
D). We adopt the frequently used logarithmic form (e.g., Makhija, 2003). As with our 
measurement of performance, we also calculated the concentration ratio for each block of 20 
decisions (‘card draws’). Alternative measures to the HI, such as the concentration ratio (Davies, 
1979), yield equivalent results.  
Parallel vs. sequential ‘trial and error’ 
We assessed the degree to which participants’ adopted a parallel rather than sequential 
approach by measuring the extent of switching back and forth between alternatives. A parallel 
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approach entails more frequent switching than a more sequential approach. We operationalized 
this by using a binary variable for Switching (SW) between decks. We computed a dummy 
indicating the choice of a deck that differed from the immediately preceding deck. This variable 
is undefined for the first deck choice. 
Tolerance for negative experiences 
The degree to which individuals tolerate negative experiences is measured by the extent 
to which they deviate from maximizing expected future payoffs based on their specific and 
imperfect information resulting from their previous selections. Specifically, we calculated the 
Relative disadvantage (RDA) of a deck selected in a particular decision. The RDA is the 
absolute difference between the past average payoff of this deck (e.g., A) and the maximum past 
average payoff of all card decks (A, B, C, D). To ensure comparability, we calculate this variable 
only for decisions where an individual has previously had experiences with all four decks (i.e., 
has drawn a card from each deck at least once).
10
 RDA is either zero or positive. Positive values 
indicate that selecting from another deck would have increased an individual’s expected payoff. 
Zero indicates that the selected deck maximizes the expected payoff.
11
  
Independent variable: Entrepreneurial experience 
Within the student sample, we measured entrepreneurial experience following Zhao et al. 
(2005) by asking — on a five-point scale ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) — about the 
participants’ levels of experience in various entrepreneurship-related activities, such as starting a 
business. We added an item about experience in being self-employed and the averaged 
                                                 
10
  Including other decisions would require additional limiting assumptions, such as assuming values for decks 
with which individuals have not yet collected experiences.  
11
  For example, if a participant has previously chosen five cards each from decks A, B, C, and D, she may 
have experienced the following past average payoffs per deck: A (10), B (100), C (30), and D (50). If she now 
selects deck A, the relative disadvantage, RDA, of the selected deck is 90 = 100 (B) – 10 (A).   
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responses. The four items were: What is your level of experience in starting an own a business? 
What is your level of experience in new product development? What is your level of experience 
in new market development? What is your level of experience in being self-employed? A 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89 indicates high internal reliability. For our analyses, we used 
entrepreneurial experience as a continuous variable. For illustration purposes, we also split the 
sample, based on the median (1.5), into more versus less entrepreneurially experienced students. 
For the non-student sample, a dummy variable indicates the status of the non-student participants 
as current or past entrepreneurs (one) or as members of the comparison group (zero). 
Control variables 
For our analyses, we included various control variables. Entrepreneurial experience is 
associated with gender and age (Parker, 2004), as is performance on the IGT (e.g., d’Acremont 
& Van der Linden, 2006; Van den Bos, Homberg, & de Visser, 2013; Overman & Pierce, 2013). 
We therefore include gender and age as demographic control variables. Age is measured in years, 
and Gender is represented with an indicator that is set to 1 if the subject is male. 
We also included control variables related to the progress of the game. We defined these 
control variables, first, at the individual level of a single selection for the analyses of the 
switching likelihood and the relative disadvantage and, second, at the aggregate level of several 
selections for the analyses of the Concentration of selections, which is assessed per block of 20 
decisions. To control for the progress of the game in terms of how many cards were drawn, we 
included the overall number of the cards that were drawn (Card number (CN)) or, for the 
Concentration of selections, the (ascending) number of the block of decisions. To facilitate 
readability of the interaction terms (Cohen et al., 2006), we centered these variables such that -1 
reflects the first and +1 the last card and block, respectively. In rare cases, due to the specific 
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design of the IGT, a deck could run empty prior to the end of the game. Then, a participant was 
not able to draw a card from that deck anymore. We therefore included three dummies in 
analyses that indicated whether decks of cards (B, C, D) were empty (A was never depleted). For 
the analyses of the Concentration of selections, we included the share of decisions in a block that 
were made after a deck had run empty.  
We expect the effects of entrepreneurial experience to depend on the progress of the 
experiment. At the start, no participant has experienced negative outcomes. Differences in 
responses to negative experiences will therefore not affect individuals’ decision making. The 
hypothesized effect of entrepreneurial experience on selection behavior, however, will show up 
later in the game and increase as the experiment proceeds. To account for this time dependency, 
we also include an interaction between entrepreneurial experience and the progress of the 
experiment, either in terms of card numbers or decision block numbers.  
In the student sample, we also have data on individuals’ willingness to take risks (Risk 
taking), which was measured with a four-item scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.68) from Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1989) that builds on the work of Gupta and Govindarajan (1984). 
Entrepreneurs might have different risk attitudes (Baron, 1998, 2004), which may affect 
performance in the IGT (Upton et al., 2011). We therefore control for risk attitudes in our 
analyses but do not find a significant effect (see the results section). This is in line with Upton et 
al. (2011), who generally find only a small effect on the part of risk attitudes on behavior in the 
IGT. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics and pairwise correlation coefficients for all variables at 
the individual level and for variables varying between individuals.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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RESULTS 
Performance in the IGT: Selecting the ‘good’ decks, C and D 
We observe clear differences between groups: Subjects with more entrepreneurial 
experience, regardless of whether they are students or not, are less likely to adjust towards 
selecting from the ‘advantageous’ decks, C and D. Specifically, entrepreneurs selected an 
average of 48.2 cards from decks C and D and 51.8 cards from decks A and B (3.6 fewer ‘good’ 
than ‘bad’ cards, a measure usually referred to as the IGT Net Score; here: -3.6), the matched 
control group selected 59.8 cards from decks C and D (IGT Net Score = +19.6), 
entrepreneurially experienced students selected 52.7 ‘good’ cards on average (IGT Net Score = 
+5.4), and students without entrepreneurial experience selected 57.2 cards on average from the 
‘advantageous’ decks, C and D (IGT Net Score = +14.4). Due to the direct relationship between 
payoffs and deck selections, cumulative payoffs differ accordingly between groups. On average, 
students with less entrepreneurial experience (based on a median split) earned 6.62 points, and 
students with more experience lost 227.59 points. Entrepreneurs lost an average of 538.00 points, 
while individuals in the matched sub-sample earned, on average, 178.33 points. The difference 
between less and more experienced students is significant (p=0.003), as is the difference between 
entrepreneurs and their counterparts (p<0.001). Overall, the performance differential that we 
observed was rather substantial. 
A direct comparison of deck choices between our study and other studies is complicated 
by substantial variation across samples and study designs, all of which affect IGT outcomes 
(Overman & Pierce, 2013). Despite this, the frequencies of selections from the ‘good’ decks, C 
and D, in our study are in line with several previous studies. Lehto and Elorinne (2003), for 
example, report an average of 56.2 ‘good’ cards, and Petry (2001) reports 59 ‘good’ cards. For 
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the entrepreneurs in our sample, we observe a negative IGT Net Score. That is, they selected 
more ‘bad’ than ‘good’ cards, which is in the range of results for VMPFC and amygdala patients 
(Bechara et al., 1999). Our observation that the students, on average, seem to perform worse than 
the control group from the general population is consistent with Evans, Kemish, and Thurnbull 
(2004), who report a negative influence on the part of education on IGT performance. Our 
observed group difference between entrepreneurs and the comparison group (11.6) is very 
similar to the difference of (10.5) between, for example, individuals with and without substance 
disorders (Barry & Petry, 2008). The difference between entrepreneurially more and less 
experienced students (4.6), however, is much smaller than in Barry and Petry (2008). 
In order to better illustrate how, over the course of the task, the various subsamples 
performed, Figure 2A plots the relative frequency of selections from ‘good’ decks C and D for 
the four groups subjects (students with high vs. low entrepreneurial experience, as well as 
entrepreneurs and their matched control group) for five blocks of 20 selections each (1-20, 21-
40, 41-60, 61-80, and 81-100). A one-way between-subjects ANOVA for the two students’ sub-
samples reveals a significant group effect (p<0.001) and, within groups, a significant effect on 
the part of the blocks (p<0.001), as well as a significant interaction between groups and blocks 
(p=0.010). Comparing entrepreneurs with the normative group, the group effect is significant 
(p<0.001), as are that of the blocks (p<0.001) and the interaction of the two (p<0.001). Thus, as 
supported by the visual inspection of Figure 2A, entrepreneurs and entrepreneurially experienced 
students differ from their comparison groups, and these differences depend on the progression of 
the game. The observation that overall, all groups tend to shift towards the advantageous decks 
indicates that the low performance scores of entrepreneurially experienced individuals are likely 
to result from exploring all decks for a longer period of time, rather than focusing on the ‘wrong’ 
29 
 
 
decks. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Broad Choice Set vs. Concentration of Choices 
H1 predicted that entrepreneurially experienced individuals would retain a broad choice 
set rather than concentrate their selections. Figure 2B plots the average concentration index 
(Herfindahl Index, HI) for the student and non-student samples for each of the five blocks of 20 
decisions that each individual made. Entrepreneurially experienced individuals in both samples 
show less concentrated choices than their comparison groups. Models 1 in Tables 2 (for the 
student sample) and 3 (for the non-student sample) report ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
analyses with the concentration index per 20-decision block as a dependent variable. The tables 
report bootstrapped standard errors corrected for the clustering of data within participants. 
Overall, over the course of the game, all participants increasingly concentrated their choices. 
This occurred, in particular and not surprisingly, when one of the decks had run empty.  
Entrepreneurially experienced individuals concentrated their choices less than the 
subjects in the comparison groups. These effects are statistically significant in both samples. H1 
is, therefore, supported. The effects are also quite stable over the course of the task. The 
corresponding interaction terms with the progress of the task are not statistically significant.  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
Parallel vs. Sequential ‘Trial and Error’  
H2 predicted that entrepreneurially experienced individuals would tend towards parallel 
rather than sequential trial-and-error learning. In the IGT, parallel learning implies more frequent 
switching between alternatives. Figure 2D plots the average relative frequency of switching on 
the part of the groups of participants for the five 20-decision blocks. Entrepreneurially 
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experienced individuals switched more often than their comparison groups. The gap between the 
groups narrows over the course of the game. To explore this switching behavior more 
thoroughly, we employed logistic regression analyses. Because switching might be more likely 
when the previously selected deck is perceived as disadvantageous, we included the prior 
selection’s relative disadvantage as an additional control variable. Model 3 in Table 2 and Model 
3 in Table 3 report the results. As expected, switching became less likely once one or more decks 
had been depleted. Also, switching became significantly less likely over the course of the task. In 
addition, the likelihood of switching increased as the prior selection’s RDA rose. That is, 
participants were more likely to switch away from decks with an inferior cumulative payoff 
history. In support of H2, entrepreneurially experienced individuals had a statistically significant 
tendency to switch more often. The differences in the probabilities of switching away from a 
deck, however, are larger at the beginning of the game (3.5 and 21 percentage points for the 
student and non-student samples, respectively) and smaller at the end (0.8 and 11 percentage 
points for the student and non-student samples, respectively).
12
 
More frequent switching by more entrepreneurially experienced individuals could be a 
result of less effort being invested into information processing and decision making or of 
boredom, implying a reduced interest in finding the best deck. Bored participants might switch 
between decks simply for sensation seeking. In both of these cases, individuals’ decision making 
would be characterized by a more heuristic instead of a deliberate thinking style and, 
                                                 
12
  We expect that entrepreneurially experienced individuals are more likely to stick to seemingly worse decks 
(see H3). Given this, we may also expect that less entrepreneurially experienced individuals are more likely to 
switch to seemingly better decks. Thus, the relatively higher degree to which entrepreneurially more experienced 
individuals switch is likely to be moderated by the relative disadvantage of the previously selected deck. The 
difference in the probabilities of switching away from a deck should be larger when switching away from decks that 
maximize one’s expected payoffs and smaller for less advantageous decks. In an additional estimation (available 
upon request), we included such a moderation effect and, indeed, found that the difference in switching likelihood is 
especially large when the previous deck was payoff-maximizing based on an individual’s past experiences with 
these decks. 
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consequently, shorter reaction times, which can serve as indicators of different types of thinking 
and decision making (Baron & Ward, 2004; Rubinstein, 2014). Because the software logged the 
time between decisions, we tested for group differences in reaction times using Poisson 
regressions, with prior payoff as a control variable. The results (available upon request) indicate 
that more entrepreneurially experienced participants took relatively more time in making their 
decisions.
13
 This would suggest that these people engaged in less heuristic, more deliberate 
decision making (Baron & Ward, 2004; Rubinstein, 2014). It is thus unlikely that a lack of 
deliberation is responsible for the differences between entrepreneurially experienced individuals 
and their comparison groups. 
Tolerance for Negative Experiences 
H3 predicted that entrepreneurs have a greater tolerance for negative experience histories, 
and must experience more negative experiences before they remove an alternative from their 
choice set. Figure 2C plots the average relative disadvantage (RDA) of the selected deck for the 
four groups and five time blocks. Entrepreneurially experienced individuals scored higher than 
the less experienced individuals. To more thoroughly analyze these differences, Model 2 in 
Table 2 and Model 2 in Table 3 report results of related OLS regression analyses. Estimations 
indicate that individuals became less likely to accept a relative disadvantage for a selected deck 
once deck B or D was depleted. These decks are more difficult to judge because they feature a 
low frequency of relatively larger losses, which creates more need for the exploration of these 
decks. Thus, exploration is less attractive once these decks, which are more difficult to judge, are 
empty. 
                                                 
13
  Based on the raw data, we observe 4.10 seconds for students with little entrepreneurial experience, 4.93 
seconds for students with high levels of entrepreneurial experience, and 6.32 seconds for entrepreneurs. For the 
matched control group, these data are not available. 
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Regarding our key model variables and in support of H3, we find that entrepreneurially 
experienced individuals (in both the student and the non-student samples) are more likely than 
their comparison groups to select alternatives that did not maximize expected future payoffs. 
They select alternatives that on average deviate more strongly from the payoff-maximizing 
alternative. The models estimate the average disadvantage of a deck that is selected as compared 
to other decks based on an individual’s past experiences gained in the prior selections. For the 
student sample, more entrepreneurially experienced students accepted deviations (disadvantages) 
that were, on average, 9 points larger than deviations accepted by less experienced students. 
Among the non-student sample, entrepreneurs accepted deviations (disadvantages) that were 23 
points larger than the deviations accepted by their comparison group. On average, across the 
course of the game, the advantageous and disadvantageous decks differed in terms of payoffs by 
25 points per decision. The observed accepted deviations are thus comparatively large.  
The explanatory power of the overall model, in terms of R-squared, however, is relatively 
low. We attribute this to biases in the OLS model that result from the fact that about 40% of all 
responses maximized payoffs. Hence, for 40% of the responses, the value for the relative 
disadvantage of the selected deck is equal to the lower bound (zero). This creates a highly 
skewed distribution. In order to account for these biases, we estimated Tobit models with a lower 
limit of zero. The results (available upon request) show that the effect sizes, that is, the 
differences between more and less entrepreneurially experienced individuals, in both samples are 
larger than in the OLS regressions. For the student sample, the difference is 14 points (more than 
50 percent larger), and for the non-student sample, the difference is 28 points (more than 20 
percent larger). This provides further support for H3. Our results are also robust when we run 
logistic regressions with a dependent variable that indicates whether or not a participant deviated 
33 
 
 
from the maximum past average payoff (analyses available upon request). 
DISCUSSION 
Summary and comparison with clinical research 
The analyses of both the student and the non-student samples reveal a clear pattern: more 
entrepreneurially experienced individuals display inferior performance on the IGT as compared 
to less entrepreneurially experienced individuals. This poor performance record does not come as 
a surprise. The IGT penalizes the longer exploration of seemingly inferior decks, which may 
have initially appeared superior). Because we hypothesized that entrepreneurially experienced 
individuals would display higher levels of exploratory perseverance, we expect them to show a 
broader exploration of decks, including seemingly inferior decks, which naturally results in 
lower performance scores on the IGT. 
The performance of entrepreneurially experienced individuals, in terms of the frequency of 
selections from the ‘good’ decks and the magnitude of final losses, is in a similar range as the 
typical performance of patients with lesions in the VMPFC and the bilateral amygdala (Bechara 
et al., 1999), schizophrenic patients (e.g., Shurman et al., 2005), and patients suffering from 
substance abuse (Barry & Petry, 2008). Does the behavioral similarity of entrepreneurially 
experienced people and patients imply that both groups suffer from similar problems? Integrating 
our findings with insights from neuropsychological studies, on the one hand, and with the 
literature on entrepreneurial metacognition, on the other hand, suggests that — despite the fact 
that the IGT-behavior of entrepreneurially experienced individuals mimics that of patients — the 
underlying mechanism is likely to be a very different one. 
Prior neuropsychological studies using the IGT have reported substantial variability in 
healthy control participants’ performances (for an overview, see Dunn et al., 2006). Most IGT 
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studies that explicitly provide such information (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999; Lehto & Elorinne, 
2003; Worthy, Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013) identify a significant sub-group of healthy control 
participants (e.g., 23% of controls in Bechara et al., 1999; 7.5% in Lehto & Elorinne, 2003) who 
exhibit impaired performance in the IGT, often similar and sometimes even worse than the 
performance of the patients (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999; Lehto & Elorinne, 2003). Although the 
behavior of these healthy underperformers resembled that of the patients, they differed in terms 
of the physiological results (i.e., SCR), which reflect emotional reactions. While the patients 
were virtually unable to generate anticipatory SCRs (and, in the case of some types of lesions, 
also reactive SCRs), the healthy underperformers generated both anticipatory and reactive SCRs, 
suggesting a well-functioning somatic system (Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 2000b). 
Healthy underperformers, thus, do not differ in terms of experiencing emotions; instead, these 
individuals seem to be able to override their affect-driven impulses or somatic markers by 
(deliberately) applying higher cognitive processes (Bechara et al., 2000). 
Considering the neuropsychological evidence on the subset of healthy IGT 
underperformers, our own findings of longer decision times and specific behavioral patterns of 
entrepreneurially experienced individuals, as well as related research on entrepreneurial 
cognition (e.g., Haynie et al. 2012; Haynie et al., 2009), we propose that our results are 
suggestive of  entrepreneurs’ particular ability to apply higher-order cognitive (meta-cognitive) 
processes to deliberately override affect-driven impulses. Metacognition has been defined by 
Schraw and Dennison (1994) as the “ability to reflect upon, understand, and control one’s 
learning” (Schraw & Dennison, 1994: 460). Scholars have suggested potentially superior 
metacognition as the basis of the “entrepreneurial mindset” (Haynie et al., 2012; Haynie et al., 
2009). Indeed, entrepreneurs have been found to possess a more versatile thinking style in that 
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they balance both nonlinear (e.g., intuitive, creative) and linear (e.g., analytic, rational) 
approaches (Groves, Vance, & Choi, 2011). Our finding that entrepreneurially experienced 
individuals take more time to make their decisions, which indicates a more deliberate thinking 
mode (Baron & Ward, 2004; Rubinstein, 2014), would support this assertion. Thus, 
entrepreneurially experienced individuals may not be impaired in terms of the development of 
affective states. Instead, in order to explore, they may cognitively overcome interfering affective 
states. Because our study design does not allow for explicitly testing these arguments, we suggest 
that future research implements the IGT in a way that allows for disentangling the mechanisms 
that differentiate healthy underperformers from individuals with neurological impairment. 
Implications 
This study adds to the literature on entrepreneurs’ perseverance by advancing exploratory 
perseverance in concurrent learning settings as a novel construct that complements existing 
conceptualizations of perseverance (e.g., Baum & Locke, 2004; Markman et al., 2005; Holland 
& Shepherd, 2013). Our conceptual refinement highlights several important aspects. First, 
perseverance can be defined at different levels, ranging from a specific action (e.g., continuing to 
choose one alternative, such as venture operations, over another, such as to exit) to a higher level 
that relates to specific behaviors that comprise sets of actions (continuing to explore several 
alternatives such as variants of technological implementation). Second, being perseverant in one 
way may, depending on the context, preclude perseverance in another way (e.g., exploratory 
perseverance precluded narrow perseverance in our study). Third, being perseverant in one way 
(e.g., exploratory perseverance in concurrent learning) may complement another type (e.g., 
perseverance in sticking to an already founded business, as illustrated by portfolio 
entrepreneurs). 
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By offering such a fine-grained conceptualization, this study opens up a new perspective 
on the discussion of perseverance in the entrepreneurship literature in general (e.g., Gimeno et 
al., 1997; Holland & Shepherd, 2013). It emphasizes the importance of defining the scope of the 
behavioral pattern in question, which may or may not be repeated when encountering adversity, 
and suggests the need to consider the potential divergence between different types of 
perseverance. The differences in scope when defining perseverance also relate to the work of van 
Gelderen (2012), who proposes a process model of perseverance in entrepreneurial goal-striving 
where goals may refer to different goal levels. In particular, referring to Elliott and Dweck 
(1988) and Kaplan and Maehr (2007), he outlines how “framing issues as learning goals rather 
than as performance goals has been proven to be related to perseverance […] The difference lies 
in the role that is ascribed to failure: failure makes it more difficult to reach a performance goal, 
but can in fact enhance learning (Cope & Watts, 2000; Sitkin, 1992).” Our results lend tentative 
empirical support to the idea that entrepreneurs may indeed differ in regard to such framing 
issues.  
Future research may also find it worthwhile to go beyond the types of perseverance 
considered in this study and investigate other conceptualizations of perseverance. Scholars might 
relax the boundary conditions that we established here in order to focus on exploratory 
perseverance (such as a lack of switching costs and an exogenously given set of alternatives). As 
a result, an even more fine-grained distinction between different types of perseverance would be 
possible. Such a comprehensive conceptual investigation of the construct might allow 
researchers to address a variety of questions, such as whether or not different types of 
perseverance are predominantly associated with specific phases of the entrepreneurial processes 
(e.g., Choi & Shepherd, 2004) or with distinct behavioral foci (e.g., Brocker et al., 2004). There 
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might also be triggers that switch an entrepreneur’s thinking from exploratory perseverance to 
persisting in execution.  
The proposed conceptualization of perseverance allowed us to identify the penchant for 
exploration that entrepreneurs are noted for as a possible reason for their perseverance. Prior 
studies have established a heightened level of perceived capacity to control adversity (e.g., 
Markman et al., 2005) as a potential driver of persisting with an activity despite negative 
experiences — a feature that the task setting in this study explicitly excluded. Another possible 
reason for entrepreneurs’ superior perseverance might lie in a pronounced susceptibility to 
status-quo bias — a tendency to opt for a previously chosen alternative disproportionately often 
— (cf., Shepherd et al., 2015) independent of learning opportunities and of control perceptions. 
Perseverance driven by status-quo bias would be reflected in the task setting employed in this 
study as narrow perseverance. Based on arguments from real options theory, it has also been 
suggested — although not empirically supported — that entrepreneurs shy away from an 
irreversible exit decision because they are more likely to value learning opportunities (Sandri et 
al., 2010). Building a conceptualization of entrepreneurial perseverance around the setting of an 
irreversible exit decision, however, blurs the distinction between exploration and exploitation 
motives because the irreversible decision implies both an end to exploration and a denial of any 
future exploitation of that opportunity. By drawing attention to settings without irreversible 
choices, we were able to focus on exploratory rather than exploitative motives. Such settings are 
not only methodologically interesting but also practically relevant. Entrepreneurs face many 
decisions in which perseverance may matter but which are not characterized by irreversibility: 
for example, choices about the width of a product or technology portfolio or choices with respect 
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to partners in teams, where the decision to take on one partner does not necessarily exclude 
another.  
We also contribute to research on entrepreneurial learning (e.g., Corbett, 2007) by 
connecting it to the discussion of entrepreneurial perseverance. Parker (2006) concludes that 
entrepreneurs are comparatively slow to update their expectations in light of new information 
(Parker, 2006) and, therefore, tend to be more perseverant. We suggest that entrepreneurs might 
deliberately seek more evidence before ultimately deciding on the value of an alternative and 
eventually removing it from their choice set. Thus, their perseverance might not result from a 
learning weakness but from higher aspirations with respect to the learning outcome. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, our interpretation suggests that rather than simply being ‘blind’ 
or less averse to losses, entrepreneurs’ perseverance may result from deliberately accepting 
losses and accompanying negative emotions as part of their learning. Resistance to automatic 
behavioral reactions to aversive emotions requires a comparatively strong meta-cognitive ability. 
Our study suggests a specific part of metacognitive ability that might be especially relevant, that 
is, the ability to deliberately suppress affect-driven reactions to negative experiences (e.g., 
Hayward et al., 2010; Shepherd et al., 2011). Such meta-cognitive ability might make 
entrepreneurs less susceptible to the ‘hot stove’ effect (Denrell & March, 2001), which leads 
individuals to erroneously under-sample information about options that have initially yielded 
negative results.  
This study also has a practical implication. The peculiarities of entrepreneurial decision 
making and learning, as well as their consequences, must be taken into account when designing 
policy interventions, entrepreneurship programs, and corporate activities that aim to create an 
‘entrepreneurial mindset’. By experiencing the IGT as part of their training (e.g., Waters-Wood 
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et al., 2012), entrepreneurs could be alerted to their tendency towards exploratory perseverance 
— and its ambiguous performance implications. It is important to note that the concept of 
exploratory perseverance can be applied beyond explaining a delayed exit from entrepreneurship. 
It also applies to the management of broad product or technology portfolios, where entrepreneurs 
seem to require stronger signals of inferiority than others in order to remove an option from their 
portfolios. While the reduced susceptibility to the ‘hot stove’ effect may result in less biased 
sampling and ultimately superior outcomes (Denrell & March, 2001), the weak performance in 
the IGT illustrates that exploratory perseverance does not necessarily translate into superior 
performance in all contexts.  
The results also have implications for the relationship between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs (e.g., Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004). Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
disagreement over how long and how extensively entrepreneurs should explore alternatives is a 
frequent source of conflict in this relationship. As an inherent feature of entrepreneurs’ decision 
making and learning, venture capitalists should be careful not to stymie exploratory perseverance 
by strictly imposing financially driven milestones. Entrepreneurs, in turn, should carefully assess 
the boundary conditions of the particular task settings they face in order to gauge whether they 
should put the brakes on their exploratory perseverance.  
Limitations and opportunities for future research 
Several limitations of our study must be accounted for in future research. The first and 
foremost limitation is related to causality and rests on using cross-sectional data. While the IGT 
has the advantage of being an extensively validated clinical measure (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; 
Dunn et al., 2006), it remains a quasi-experimental setup (Grant & Wall, 2009). Because we are 
not able to randomly manipulate entrepreneurial experience, we cannot clearly determine 
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whether people who showed a specific behavior on the IGT were more likely to have gained 
entrepreneurial experience or whether their entrepreneurial experience caused that specific 
behavior in the IGT.  
A further limitation results from using an abstract and laboratory-like setting. On the one 
hand, the level of abstraction ensures that behavior of participants is unlikely to be confounded 
by related experiences in the field. This is important because these experiences would, by 
definition, differ between more and less entrepreneurially experienced participants. Thereby, the 
design increases internal validity and reduces threats from endogeneity biases. Experiments, 
however, are often challenged based on their limited external validity and generalizability, 
especially with regard to sample size and sample composition. Although the size of our non-
student sample, including real entrepreneurs, is similar to other sample sizes reported in the 
entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Gatewood et al., 2002; Sandri et al., 2010), we acknowledge 
that there could be unobserved variables correlated with the variables of interest, confounding 
our findings in the non-student sample. Furthermore, we do not have much information on the 
individuals in the normative sample, especially regarding their entrepreneurial experience. The 
normative sample is drawn from the general population, which is characterized by a relatively 
low percentage of entrepreneurs. We, therefore, believe that it is safe to assume that the 
entrepreneurs subsample is characterized by significantly higher levels of entrepreneurial 
experience than the subsample matched from the normative sample. The larger student sample, 
which is split solely based on self-reported entrepreneurial experience, provides a setting that is 
less susceptible to such challenges.  
Having both a rather large and homogeneous student sample and a smaller, more 
heterogeneous sample of entrepreneurs with a matched control group enables us to draw more 
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robust conclusions. A valuable way to continue this research would be to expand the range of 
entrepreneurial sub-populations included in the sample in future larger-scale studies and collect 
more extensive background information on participants. Collecting data from different types of 
entrepreneurs (e.g., novice, serial, portfolio; successful vs. unsuccessful) at different stages of 
their professional tenure and including detailed background information on participants (e.g., 
personality traits and profiles; cf. Rauch & Frese, 2007) would probably allow scholars to even 
more closely link the behavioral patterns observed in the lab to ‘real-life’ implications. Given the 
specific design of the IGT, with its exploration of multiple options, portfolio entrepreneurs, with 
their engagement in multiple businesses, are an especially interesting population. 
Another set of limitation relates to the specific design of the IGT. The design has been 
developed to identify perseverance in behavior that initially appears superior but, over time, 
reveals its inferiority (for example, keep selecting from decks A and B).
14
 While the design of 
the IGT deviates from entrepreneurial settings in several respects, it is precisely these deviations 
that enable us to identify the exploratory motive behind entrepreneurs’ perseverance by 
excluding other possibly confounding motives. Sunk costs and switching costs, including 
irreversible decisions, are often elements of entrepreneurial contexts. Including them into our 
experiment, however, would have introduced an additional confounding factor, hampering the 
clear identification of exploration-motivated perseverance. Furthermore, entrepreneurial settings 
are often characterized by opportunities that are either created by or at least influenced by an 
entrepreneur’s capabilities; that is, the outcome at least partially depends on an entrepreneur’s 
capabilities (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008; Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Our research design deliberately 
                                                 
14
  The alternatives offered in the IGT are admittedly rather limited (Bechara et al., 1994). There are efforts to 
modify the standardized version of the IGT by extending its alternatives (e.g., Chiu & Lin, 2007; Horstmann et al., 
2012; Tom et al., 2007). Such efforts could improve our understanding of the precise features of a set of options that 
appeals to entrepreneurs — and, possibly, to which types of entrepreneurs these options appeal. 
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focuses on alternatives with externally determined outcomes. Thereby, we can differentiate the 
exploratory motive of perseverance from an effectuating motive, where people persevere because 
they believe that they, more so than others, can turn a seemingly inferior alternative into a good 
one. Both these limitations imply that our results positively identify exploratory perseverance as 
a typical behavior of entrepreneurs. This behavior, however, may act in concert with or could be 
leveraged or perhaps mitigated by other mechanisms that might also trigger perseverance, 
depending on the specific context.  
Future studies are likely to benefit from being very precise in regard to what elements of 
their research design could be responsible for perseverance. We suggest that at least three 
elements should be differentiated: switching costs (including irreversible decisions reflected by 
infinite switching cost), endogenous outcomes, and feedback about hidden qualities of the 
behavioral alternatives. Studies that combine all these characteristics would offer a context that 
more closely reflects real-life entrepreneurial settings. In doing so, they allow for further insights 
into the relative importance of the various motives that underlie entrepreneurs’ perseverance, 
ranging from exploration to psychological inertia, such as the status-quo bias, and to 
overoptimistic beliefs in one’s ability to “make it work”. At the same time, such a combination 
of features also creates difficulties in disentangling the various reasons for entrepreneurial 
perseverance. Scientific progress on this topic is, therefore, likely to rest on the triangulation of 
studies of different types. 
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TABLE 1:  
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION TABLE 
  
 
 Summary statistics  Binary correlations at the individual level 
 Students Non-students              
Sample size N= 349 N= 100              
Dependent Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Relative disadvantage 27.87 10.95 28.09 13.93  • -.27
**
  .32
**
 -.56
***
 -.04 -.07   .19
+
  .23
*
 -.35
***
   .30
**
 
2 Concentration in selection -1.00 0.23 -0.94 0.28  -.51
***
 • -.86
***
  .59
***
 -.00 -.10   .04  .24
*
  .49
***
  -.37
***
 
3 Switching likelihood 0.53 0.24 0.49 0.28   .44
***
 -.83
***
 • -.52
***
 -.06  .11  -.11 -.16 -.39
***
   .29
**
 
4 Selection of deck C or D 0.55 0.12 0.57 0.15  -.74
***
  .56
***
 -.46
***
 • -.17
+
 -.08  -.28
**
  .25
*
  .46
***
  -.33
***
 
Demographic control variables                  
5 Age 23.63 3.42 39.69 10.16   .07 -.08 -.02 -.09
+
 • .30
**
   .11 -.01 -.12  -.01 
6 Gender (female) 0.64 0.48 0.24 0.43  -.06 -.05  .04  .00 -.06 •  -.10 -.10 -.02   .00 
7 Risk taking 2.83 0.69     .02  .01  .01  .07 -.03  .09
+
 •      
Game control variables                  
8 Empty deck B  0.02 0.07 0.01 0.04   .33
***
  .06  .01 -.46
***
  .02 -.01 -.03 • -.03 -.04  .30
**
 
9 Empty deck C  0.03 0.08 0.00 0.03  -.23
***
  .47
***
 -.36
***
  .42
***
 -.07 -.03  .04 -.11
*
 • -.06  -.04 
10 Empty deck D  0.04 0.10 0.02 0.06  -.39
***
  .53
***
 -.40
***
  .46
***
 -.03  .02  .03 -.15
**
 -.06 •  .02 
Entrepreneurial experience                  
11 Entrepreneurial experience  1.68 0.77     .29
***
 -.16
**
  .13
*
 -.26
***
  .15
**
 -.16
**
 -.02  .08 -.13
*
 -.02 •  
12 Entrepreneur (vs. comparison group)   0.25 0.44             • 
Notes: Summary and correlation statistics are reported at the individual level; decision-level variables are averaged at the individual level. 
Only variables that vary between individuals are reported. The lower left triangle in the correlation table is based on the student sample; the 
upper right triangle is based on entrepreneurs and their matched counterparts from the normative sample. Pearson correlations are reported. 
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TABLE 2:  
REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR STUDENT SAMPLE 
 
Model  1  2  3 
Dependent Variable Concentration of 
selections(HI) 
Relative disadvantage of 
selected deck (RDA) 
Switching likelihood 
(SW) 
Constant -0.93 (0.06)*** 28.56 (3.59)*** 0.21 (0.34) 
Demographic control variables       
Age -0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.14) -0.01 (0.01) 
Gender (female) -0.04 (0.02)+ -0.55 (1.10) 0.12 (0.10) 
Personality control variables       
Risk taking 0.00 (0.01) 0.41 (0.49) 0.03 (0.05) 
Game control variables       
Empty deck B (frequency over block) 0.08 (0.04)+     
Empty deck B (dummy)   -10.46 (1.67)*** 0.00 (0.14) 
Empty deck C (frequency over block) 0.40 (0.06)***     
Empty deck C (dummy)   -6.17 (4.43) -1.07 (0.20)*** 
Empty deck D (frequency over block) 0.47 (0.05)***     
Empty deck D (dummy)   -7.75 (2.71)** -0.88 (0.15)*** 
Card block CB  0.03 (0.01)** -  -  
Card CN -  0.16 (0.84) -0.23 (0.05)*** 
Prior selection’s RDA     0.69 (0.07)*** 
Entrepreneurship       
Entrepreneurial experience EE -0.03 (0.01)*** 2.72 (0.49)*** 0.09 (0.04)* 
Interactions       
EE x CB  -0.01 (0.01)     
EE x CN   1.86 (0.71)** -0.06 (0.04) 
Observations (subjects) 1745 (349) 31028 (349) 31028 (349) 
R² / Pseudo-R² (Wald χ²) 0.137 (270.59)*** 0.014 (84.60)*** 0.032 (265.91)*** 
Notes: OLS regressions (1, 2) and logistic regression (3) with cluster-bootstrapped (>2,000 repetitions) standard errors in 
parentheses. Because we have multiple observations per participant, there may be autocorrelation. The clustering procedure 
accounts for these effects. Other estimators, such as OLS and logistic regression with cluster-robust standard errors, yield similar 
results (available upon request). Herfindahl index (logarithm) is calculated for five blocks of twenty cards. Card number and card 
block are centered, i.e., between -1 for the first card/block and +1 for the last card/block. All significance levels are based on the 
normal approximation, but percentile-based bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals lead to equivalent levels of 
confidence. *** p<0.001;  ** p<0.01;  * p<0.05;  + p<0.10 
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TABLE 3:  
REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND COMPARISON GROUP 
 
Model  1  2  3 
Dependent Variable Concentration of 
selections (HI) 
Relative disadvantage of 
selected deck (RDA) 
Switching likelihood 
(SW) 
Constant -0.91 (0.11)*** 26.64 (5.12)*** 0.12 (0.49) 
Demographic control variables       
Age 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.13) -0.01 (0.01) 
Gender (female) -0.06 (0.05) -2.27 (2.56) 0.44 (0.25)+ 
Game control variables       
Empty deck B (frequency over block) -0.01 (0.26)     
Empty deck B (dummy)   -6.77 (6.32) -0.27 (0.36) 
Empty deck C (frequency over block) 0.42 (0.59)     
Empty deck C (dummy)   14.21 (16.05) -0.30 (0.94) 
Empty deck D (frequency over block) 0.34 (0.20)+     
Empty deck D (dummy)   -13.93 (5.00)** -0.65 (0.36)+ 
Card block CB  0.11 (0.03)***     
Card CN   -0.41 (1.93) -0.30 (0.11)** 
Prior selection’s RDA     0.75 (0.16)*** 
Entrepreneurship       
Entrepreneurs versus comparison group -0.24 (0.05)*** 10.17 (2.29)*** 0.71 (0.25)** 
Interactions       
EE x CB -0.06 (0.04)     
EE x CN   1.34 (2.74) -0.23 (0.22) 
Observations (subjects) 500 (100) 8891 (100) 8891 (100) 
R² (Wald χ²) 0.136 (64.63)*** 0.021 (42.71)*** 0.048 (72.52)*** 
Notes: OLS regressions (1, 2) and logistic regression (3) with cluster-bootstrapped (>2,000 repetitions) standard errors in 
parentheses. Because we have multiple observations per participant, there may be autocorrelation. The clustering procedure 
accounts for these effects. Other estimators, such as OLS and logistic regression with cluster-robust standard errors, yield similar 
results (available upon request). The Herfindahl index (logarithm) is calculated for five blocks of twenty cards. Card number and 
card block are centered, i.e., between -1 for the first card/block and +1 for the last card/block. All significance levels are based on 
the normal approximation, but percentile-based bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals lead to equivalent levels of 
confidence. *** p<0.001;  ** p<0.01;  * p<0.05;  + p<0.10 
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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE SCREENSHOT 
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FIGURE 2:  
DESCRIPTIVES FOR FOUR GROUPS IN BLOCKS OF 20 SELECTIONS EACH [MEAN, STANDARD ERROR] 
 
